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DETERMINANTS OF PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENTS ACROSS BRICS 
COUNTRIES 
 
 
Abstract 
The determinants of private equity investments (particularly venture capital 
investments) have been studied extensively across developed economies. This is 
however not the case among emerging markets. Hence, this study primarily focuses 
on the determinants of private equity (inclusive of all sub-classes) among the BRICS 
countries. Six macroeconomic and market related explanatory variables, including the 
corruption perception index are studied. Private equity funds raised across BRICS are 
used as the proxy for private equity investments. These variables are studied using 
panel data analysis predicated on the fixed effects model over an eight-year 
observation period. The study reveals that GDP growth and real interest rate are both 
statistically significant and positively related to private equity investments across the 
BRICS countries. Furthermore, market capitalization growth and corporate tax rates 
are statistically significant and are both found to be negatively related to the dependent 
variable.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Carsalade and Rennó (2014) observe that, subsequent to the 2009 global economic 
crisis, limited partners (LPs) - third-party private equity (PE) investors preferred 
emerging markets over developed economies as a source of investment return. Most 
notably, Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) were observed as beneficiaries of this 
investment trend. PE investments in emerging markets have experienced remarkable 
growth over time. In 2012, South Africa (SA) had the second highest recorded number 
of PE deals (164) behind the United States (US) which had 477 deals among a total 
of 30 countries (including both emerging and developed economies); India had the 
fifth highest and China the tenth highest recorded number of deals (SAVCA, 2013). 
 
Klonowski (2011a:26) posits that “international investors perceive emerging markets 
as being resilient to financial turmoil and economic downturns”, and that emerging 
markets present an opportunity for investors to diversify their portfolios through PE 
investments given the inherent counter-cyclical nature of emerging markets. 
Interestingly, previous studies primarily focus on the determinants of PE (most notably 
venture capital (VC)) investments among developed economies, notably the US and 
Europe. Hence, this study is predicated upon the objective of identifying and 
quantitatively analysing the key drivers or determinants of PE investments among the 
BRICS countries.   
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The PE investment industry has grown significantly over time and has contributed to 
the development, expansion and growth of a myriad successful multinational 
businesses. This has been most evident across developed economies like the US and 
the UK. This contribution is most notable in a number of innovative and ground-
breaking companies such as Apple Inc., Microsoft Corporation, Google (subsidiary of 
Alphabet Inc.), and Facebook Inc., among others (Ning, Wang and Yu, 2015). In 
addition, PE investments have also been shown to contribute positively towards the 
creation of employment. Demaria (2013) asserts that venture and growth capital 
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(subclasses of PE investing) are net creators of employment. These assertions are 
shared by Keuschnigg (2004), Samila and Sorenson (2011), Puri and Zarutskie (2012) 
and Ning et al. (2015).  
 
The preferred target (or investee) companies are unlisted businesses that have 
substantial business expansionary or growth potential in the form of revenue growth 
and/or cost reduction opportunities. Sinyard (2013) points out that PE investment 
managers adhere to a structured seven-step process when appraising the 
attractiveness of potential PE investment opportunities (target companies). This 
process includes reviewing the investee company’s business plan, conducting 
management meetings, conducting preliminary due diligence, the drafting of a term 
sheet, additionally conducting extensive due diligence, making the investment 
decision and lastly finalising the legal documentation as well as closing and funding 
the PE transaction.  
 
The first five steps act as inputs into the decision making process of PE investments, 
and can be viewed as business-specific endogenous factors of the investee 
companies that drive PE investment flows therein, however, a number of studies have 
shown that exogenous factors such as gross domestic product (GDP) growth, 
corporate tax rates, market capitalization growth, exports, interest rates and initial 
public offerings, among others, also act as determinants of PE investments 
(particularly VC investments).  
 
2.1. Determinants of venture capital investments among developed economies 
 
The determinants of PE investments (or VC investments) are predominantly studied 
through understanding the key supply and demand forces that influence PE 
investments. Poterba (1989) posits that changes in VC fund raising emanate from 
changes in the supply or demand of VC. Gompers and Lerner (1999) further build on 
these assertions by establishing the VC supply and demand equilibrium approach to 
examine the determinants of VC raising in the US. It is from this approach developed 
by Gompers and Lerner (1998) that the equilibrium model formulated by Jeng and 
Wells (2000) is premised. Jeng and Wells (2000) study the evolution of VC 
investments across 21 countries (consisting predominantly of European countries as 
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well as Japan and the US, among others). Adongo (2011) studies the determinants of 
VC investments in Africa by means of using a cross-section analysis approach 
predicated on the work of Gompers and Lerner (1998) as well as that of Jeng and 
Wells (2000). Precup (2015) uses a similar approach to study the determinants of PE 
investments in Europe, focusing primarily on 27 countries from 2000 to 2013. Groh 
and Wallmeroth (2016) expand on the analysis performed by Jeng and Wells (2000) 
by chiefly focusing on 118 countries, 78 of which are emerging markets, using panel 
data from 2000 to 2013. 
 
Groh and Wallmeroth (2016) study different determinants compared to Jeng and Wells 
(2000). The primary variables studied by Groh and Wallmeroth (2016) include mergers 
and acquisitions (M & A) activity, legal rights and investor protection, innovation, 
intellectual protection (IP), bribery and corruption, corporate taxes, exports, and 
unemployment. Jeng and Wells (2000) study a plethora of variables including initial 
public offerings (IPOs), GDP growth, market capitalization growth, labour market 
rigidities, accounting standards, private pension funds among others. Ning et al. 
(2015) formulate hypotheses on the determinants of VC investments studied based 
on the arguments of Poterba (1989) and Gompers and Lerner (1998), in conjunction 
with other selected literature, including that of Jeng and Wells (2000) to examine the 
volatility and macroeconomic drivers of VC drivers in the US. The determinants studied 
include macroeconomic variables (real GDP growth, industry production index, 
unemployment rate and annual consumer price inflation) as well as market indicators 
(Russell 2000 return, NASDAQ Composite return, 10-year T-Bond yield and the 
number of IPOs).  
 
Michelacci and Suarez (2004) note the importance of stock market activity as a 
contributing variable to PE investment activity. Synonymously, Kelly (2012:321) 
asserts that market capitalization, a “commonly used indicator for depth and liquidity 
of capital markets”, is found to be a statistically significant determinant of PE buyout 
investment activity. Interestingly, Jeng and Wells (2000) find that market capitalization 
is not a significant driver of VC investment, however, it needs noting that IPOs are 
found to be the strongest driver of VC investing and that private pension fund levels 
are a significant driver over time. 
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Bernoth and Colavecchio (2014) study macroeconomic determinants of PE 
investments across 13 developed (western European) and only 3 developing (central 
and eastern European) countries. The identified drivers vary, albeit they are similar in 
some cases across the western and central eastern European countries. Notable 
significant determinants of PE activity across these countries include economic activity 
(measured as annual GDP growth), the inflation rate, unit labour costs, unemployment 
rate, the institutional, legal environment and similar to Kelly (2012), market 
capitalization. Gompers and Lerner (1998) note the positive effect of the economic 
growth on VC in the US. In addition, Carvell, Kim, Ma and Ukhov (2013) find evidence 
of correlation between VC flows and GDP growth in the US. Interestingly, Jeng and 
Wells (2000) find that GDP growth is not a statistically significant driver of VC among 
21 countries (including the US). 
 
In the US, Gompers and Lerner (1998) find that both economic growth and R&D 
expenditure have a positive relationship with VC activity. In addition, lower capital 
gains tax rates were also identified as having a positive relationship with VC activity. 
In congruence with Gompers and Lerner (1998), Hassan (2010) argues that a 
considerable number of developed countries have bolstered the growth and 
development of local start-ups while simultaneously stimulating their respective PE 
industries through the reduction of capital gains tax. The reduction of capital gains tax 
was one of the key instruments that Egypt employed as an emerging market to 
encourage PE investments in the country. 
The determinants of PE (including VC) investments in or across emerging economies 
are seldom studied as there is limited literature primarily focused on studying the 
bespoke drivers or determinants of PE investments in emerging markets. This could 
arguably be attributed to PE investing still being in its nascent stages of development 
in emerging markets compared to developed economies like the UK and the US, 
where PE investing has been active since the late 1970s and early 80s (BVCA (2010), 
and Davidoff (2009)).  
 
2.2. Determinants of private equity across emerging markets 
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Emerging markets are characterized by rapid economic growth and generally present 
attractive investment opportunities due to their perceived resilience to economic 
downturns. Klonowski (2013) notes that the rapid economic growth associated with 
emerging markets is driven by an expanding middle class, high rural-to-urban 
migration and increased population wealth. Binnie (2013) adds that Brazil’s growing 
middle class, commodities wealth and investor-friendly legal framework is what makes 
it an attractive PE investment destination. This phenomenon has also been observed 
in India. Kumari (2013) asserts that rapid growth of GDP coupled with business friendly 
regulations have contributed to making India an attractive VC and PE investment 
destination. It is plausible that the economic growth quality of developing economies 
drives the demand for PE investments among other forms of investment vehicles as it 
can be noted from the findings of Gompers and Lerner (1999), Carvell et al. (2013) 
and Bernoth and Colavecchio (2014). It has been discussed in the preceding section 
of the literature review that economic growth tends to be a positive driver of VC 
investments among developed economies, however, this remains to be proven for 
emerging countries (BRICS in this case). Klonowski (2013) adds that emerging 
markets are poised to experience high growth in PE investments as the economic 
growth impetus is expected to continue. 
 
The idiosyncratic determinants of PE investments (inclusive of all subclasses) across 
emerging markets (central and eastern Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent 
states, Turkey, Russia, Emerging Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East 
and North America as well as Continental Africa) have been studied on a limited basis 
compared to developed markets like the developed European countries, the UK and 
the US. This is the case even for VC investments (as a subclass of PE investments) 
as there is limited literature that primarily focuses on quantitatively analysing and 
understanding the idiosyncratic determinants of VC investments among emerging 
markets. Groh and Wallmeroth (2016) assert that the majority of the extant studies 
that analyse and evaluate a multitude of variables which drive (attract, increase or 
decrease) VC investments focus on developed economies. Oberli (2014:50), in a 
study focused on understanding the drivers of PE investments in Asia (China, India, 
South Korea, Vietnam, Singapore and Hong Kong), asserts that “research with regard 
to emerging economies is scarce.” 
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Notable studies that focus on understanding the determinants of VC investments in 
emerging markets include those of Adongo (2011) and Klonowski (2011b) as well as 
Groh and Wallmeroth (2016). Adongo (2011) studies thirty six African countries and 
finds that the rule of law, research and development expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP, and robust information flow between investors and potential investees are 
positively and significantly related to VC activity. Klonowski (2011b) studies the 
evolution of the PE market in Poland in conjunction with its drivers and returns. The 
author finds that stable economic growth, strong entrepreneurship, institutional 
infrastructure improvements, and exit market development acted as the key pillars of 
continued development in PE investments in Poland over two decades (1990-2010). 
Groh and Wallmeroth (2016) conclude that M & A activity, legal rights and investor 
protection, innovation, intellectual property protection, corruption, corporate taxes and 
unemployment all have a high impact on VC investment activity; however, bribery and 
corruption, as well as innovation, were observed to play a more pronounced role in 
developing markets than in developed markets. 
 
Oberli (2014) selectively studies a plethora of PE investment activity determinants in 
Asian emerging markets, amongst which is the fiscal/legal environment and 
government intervention within which the PE investment activity is focused. Among 
the variables studied by Oberli (2014) include past returns to investors, IPOs, recent 
investment activity, GDP growth, (short-term) interest rates, gross domestic volume of 
savings, capital gains taxation, investment regulations, labour market policies, the 
maturity of the PE market (and its size) etc. These variables are akin to those studied 
by Bonini and Alkan (2011). 
Oberli (2014) notes that, unlike in developed markets (the US, the UK, Canada, Israel, 
Japan, Australia, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Austria 
and Switzerland), the amount of credit supplied by the banking sector is negatively 
correlated with the PE funds raised  in emerging markets (China, India, South Korea, 
Vietnam, Singapore and Hong Kong). The author notes that this could be due to direct 
competition between banks and PE investors. Babarinde (2012) posits that the 
burgeoning of interest in Africa as a preferred PE investment destination could be due 
to a number of factors, including political and economic reforms, a budding middle 
class, relatively high return on investment, and successful PE exits. 
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2.3. Understanding the drivers of private equity investments across BRICS 
 
The determinants of PE investments among the BRICS countries (including SA) have 
not been studied extensively as there is very limited literature that focuses on 
quantitatively studying the idiosyncratic determinants of PE investments among 
emerging markets, let alone among the BRICS countries. Woeller (2012) qualitatively 
studies the legal and economic environment across the BRIC group (excluding SA) in 
relation to PE investments. Klonowski (2011a) focuses on the economic analysis of 
the BRIC countries and, similar to Woeller (2012), assesses the PE dynamics 
encapsulating the regulatory environment, investment process and returns among the 
BRIC countries. Albeit the study conducted by Groh and Wallmeroth (2016) includes 
the BRICS countries in its universal dataset, it is important to note that the dataset 
analysed therein comprises of both emerging and developed economies, thus not 
enabling for the bespoke drivers/determinants of PE investments specific to the BRICS 
countries to be adequately analysed and understood.  
 
Fisher and Smyth (2013) assert that when US private equity investors are interested 
in emerging markets, they are sensitive to location-specific problems, which range 
from the protection of shareholder rights, tax treatment of capital gains to the 
development of the securities markets. Hallisy (2008) notes that in Russia, inadequate 
investor protection acts as a specific impediment to US private equity investments. As 
a result Russia has implemented various amendments to their investor protection 
law(s) to address this issue. In India, Kumari (2013) highlights that the expedited 
growth of GDP as a macroeconomic determinant, coupled with other factors, 
contributed significantly towards the development of the VC industry there. In 
congruence with Kumari (2013), Ratanpal (2008) asserts that India’s economic 
growth, driven by investments in infrastructure, domestic consumption, and India’s 
unique position as a preferred hub for global outsourcing as well as growth-oriented 
policies promulgated by the government, have led to growth in PE investments. 
 
Carsalade and Rennó (2014:3) highlight that improved macroeconomic performance 
coupled with policymaking stability and other factors “drove PE in Brazil to a cyclical 
peak”. Hallisy (2008) notes that economic reforms such as the privatization of state-
owned companies contributed significantly towards the growth of PE investments in 
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Russia. Owens (2011:24) points out that strong economic performance and improved 
institutional frameworks in Brazil, India and China subsequent to the 2008 economic 
crisis contributed to making these countries “attractive” for PE investments. Molatlhwe 
(2016) concludes that factors such as economic growth, developed financial markets 
and a sophisticated banking system have contributed to the growth of PE investments 
in SA. It is important to note that these studies only show plausible drivers or 
determinants of PE investments across the individual BRICS countries, whereas this 
study seeks to analyse the BRICS countries collectively as a group. 
 
It important to highlight the role that governments (BRICS governments in this case) 
can play in structurally driving or attracting PE investments through policy-making 
mechanisms. Kelly (2012:326) argues that governments could attract more PE 
investment activity through providing “fiscal incentives for R & D activity”, and through 
the implementation of initiatives that promote innovation. Hassan (2010) notes that the 
Egyptian government reduced personal and corporate tax rates, increased energy 
subsidies and privatized a number of entities in 2005. The result of this was a 
significant increase in foreign direct investment in the form of PE investments. 
Similarly, Adongo (2011) finds that capital gains tax rates are negatively and 
significantly related to VC activity in Africa. Mpofu and Sibanda (2015) have found that 
the dearth of regulation, market liquidity and viable business sectors, in conjunction 
with political risks, are the main impediments to PE operations in Zimbabwe. 
 
In agreement with Hassan (2010) and Adongo (2011), Bernoth and Colavecchio 
(2014) find that the central and eastern European governments employ low corporate 
tax rates and tax incentives to attract institutional investors. Pradhan, Maradana, Zaki, 
Dash and Jayakumar (2016) argue that per capita growth can be stimulated through 
the promulgation of policy strategies that promote VC investments through robust 
regulatory governance, encouragement of government investments, and by 
incentivizing private sectors to invest in the VC funds. Groh and Wallmeroth (2016) 
find that reduction of corruption and bribery within both the public and political sectors 
has a positive impact on VC investments. Variables like the corruption perception 
index, corporate tax rates and the legal infrastructure can be influenced by 
policymakers, lawmakers or the government to positively promote the inflow of PE 
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investments, thus it is imperative for the impact of such variables on PE investments 
to be studied and understood. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This study employs quantitative secondary data to analyse and understand the 
determinants of PE investments among the BRICS countries. The study uses data 
spanning eight years (2008-2015) across the research variables are used. The 
research variables are listed on TABLE 3.1 below. 
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TABLE 3.1: Research variables   
Variable Measurement Transformation Hypotheses 
Real interest rates Percentage value  1) Real interest rates have a 
positive relationship with 
private equity capital funds 
raised. 
GDP growth Percentage of GDP  2) GDP growth has a 
positive relationship with 
private equity capital funds 
raised. 
Corruption 
perception index 
Numerical value Log 
transformation 
3) The corruption perception 
index has a positive 
relationship with private 
equity capital funds raised. 
Corporate tax rates Percentage value  4) Corporate tax rate has a 
negative relationship with 
private equity capital raised 
Market capitalization 
growth 
Percentage of GDP  5) Market capitalization has 
a positive relationship with 
private equity capital funds 
raised 
Unemployment Rate Percentage  6) Unemployment has a 
negative relationship with 
private equity capital raised 
Private equity funds 
raised  
Numerical value ($) Log 
transformation 
 
Sources: Jeng and Wells (2000); Groh and Wallmeroth (2016); Author’s deductions
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The subsequent section outlines the assumptions formulated on the variables listed 
on TABLE 3.1 above.  
 
3.1. Research hypotheses 
3.1.1. Dependent variable 
In line with Precup (2015), the PE investment variable will be measured as the total 
amount of capital raised across the BRICS countries over an observation period of 
eight years (2008-2015). This approach is also in congruence with Gompers and 
Lerner (1998), who study the determinants of VC fundraising, as well as Poterba 
(1989), Jeng and Wells (2000) and Marti and Balboa (2001). The explanatory variables 
are discussed in the subsequent section. 
 
3.1.2. Independent variables 
3.1.2.1. Expected return on investment 
Gompers and Lerner (1998:6) argue that “higher expected returns lead to a greater 
desire of investors to supply venture capital”. This argument presents a plausible 
rationale in support of expected returns from PE investments being a reasonable driver 
of the flow of PE investments into a particular economy. Furthermore, Gompers and 
Lerner (1998:6) assert that the demand schedule for VC is “the quantity of 
entrepreneurial firms seeking venture capital that can supply a particular expected rate 
of return”. Gompers and Lerner (1998) further assert that the expected rate of return 
is considered to be the price of PE investments.  It is from both these assertions that 
the assumption that as the expected return on PE capital investments increases, fewer 
entrepreneurs demand capital, is predicated.  
 
3.1.2.2. Real interest rate 
PE investors tend to partly use their own capital as supplied from their limited partners 
(LPs) and capital obtained through leverage via debt capital markets. Thus higher 
interest rates make it expensive for PE investors to raise funds through the debt capital 
markets. Gompers and Lerner (1998) posit that bonds are among the alternative asset 
classes available to venture capitalists and as a result higher interest rates make PE 
assets less attractive to PE investors. However, from an entrepreneur’s point of view, 
higher interest rates make it costlier for unlisted companies to raise capital through 
debt capital markets, thus making PE capital an attractive alternative. It then prevails 
  14 
to hypothetically assume that an increase in interest rates may lead to a decline in the 
supply of the quantity of PE investments provided, however, from the demand 
perspective, the opposite could be true. Gompers and Lerner (1998), as well as 
Romain and de La Potterie (2004,) argue in favour of the latter argument. For the 
purposes of this study, the demand side is considered and thus the expectation is that 
an increase in interest rates leads to an increase in the demand for PE investments. 
 
3.1.2.3. Economic growth 
Growth in the economy is synonymous with a generally healthy economy. A growing 
economy translates to the development of more business opportunities for 
entrepreneurs and in turn this engenders an increase in the demand for VC (Gompers 
and Lerner, 1998). This argument is also in congruence with Romain and de La 
Potterie (2004). It then follows that GDP growth is hypothetically expected to have a 
positive relationship with PE investments in the BRICS countries. 
 
3.1.2.4. Corruption 
Precup (2015) studies the determinants of the PE market in Europe using previously 
studied determinants as well as productivity and the corruption index as additional 
variables. Precup (2015) finds that the corruption index is relevant in explaining the 
development of PE activity in Europe. Groh and Wallmeroth (2016) assert that 
decreases in bribery and corruption practices have a positive statistical significance 
on VC investments. Thus the assumption that an increase in bribery and corruption 
leads to a decrease in the supply of PE investments can reasonably be postulated. 
For the purposes of this study the corruption perception index as published by the 
Transparency International organisation is employed. The corruption perception index 
ranks countries based on how corrupt their public sector is viewed to be by surveyed 
independent institutions. Prior to the year 2012, the ranking was based on a scale of 
0-10, where 0 represents countries that are viewed to be highly corrupt and 10 
represents countries that are viewed to be without corruption. As of 2012 the scale 
was changed to be 0-100 where 100 indicates countries that are viewed to be without 
corruption and 0 still bears the same interpretation (Transparency International, 2015). 
 
3.1.2.5. Corporate tax 
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A plethora of extant literature (Hassan (2010), Adongo (2011), Bonini & Alkan (2011), 
Bernoth & Colavecchio (2014) and Oberli (2014)) have shown that an increase in 
corporate taxes has a negative impact on VC investments and hence it arguably 
follows that an assumption about the counter-reactionary relationship between 
corporate taxes and PE investments can be reasonably predicated from these 
findings.  
 
3.1.2.6. Market capitalization 
The assumption considered with regards to market capitalization (market cap) as a 
determinant of PE investment among the BRICS countries is that an increase in the 
market cap is indicative of liquidity and viable exit opportunities for PE investors that 
rely on initial public offerings for divestment purposes. Thus an increase in market cap 
is synonymous to an increase in PE investments. This assumption is in line with the 
findings of Felix, Gulamhumssen and Pires (2007), who found that market cap has a 
positive relationship with VC investments. Similarly, Precup (2015) found market cap 
to be statistically significant in driving PE in Europe. 
 
3.1.2.7. Unemployment 
Unemployment was found to be statistically insignificant and was also found to have 
a negative impact on VC investments (Groh & Wallmeroth, 2016). The authors posit 
that this could be attributed to the argument that the unemployment rate can act as an 
economic harbinger that could be indicative of a thriving or anaemic economy which 
could in turn drive VC investments subject to the country’s holistic economic position.  
Thus it can be conjectured that an increase in the unemployment rate has a negative 
impact on PE investments.  
 
3.2. Model specification 
The modelling approach used in this study is in line with Jeng and Wells (2000), as 
well as Gompers and Lerner (1998). Poterba (1989) posits that changes in VC fund 
raising emanate from changes in the supply or demand of VC. Gompers and Lerner 
(1998), building on the assertions of Poterba (1989), established the VC supply and 
demand equilibrium approach to examine the determinants of VC raising in the US. It 
is from the approach developed by Gompers and Lerner (1998) that the model derived 
by Jeng and Wells (2000) is premised.  
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3.2.1. Model  
The model is derived from using supply and demand equations of PE investments. It 
is from these equations that an equilibrium model encapsulating the research variables 
is derived. The model can be mathematically represented as follows: 
ܲܧ௜௧ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛଵܩܦ ௜ܲ௧ ൅ ߛଶܯܭ ௜ܶ௧ ൅ ߛଷܧ݉݌݈௜௧ ൅ ߛସܫ݊ݐ௜௧ ൅ ߛହܤܥܫ௜௧ ൅ ߛ଺ܶܽݔ௜௧ (1)
 
where ܩܦܲ represents the GDP growth, ܯܭܶ is the market capitalization growth, ܫ݊ݐ 
is the real interest rate, ܤܥܫ is the corruption perception index, ܶܽݔ is the corporate 
tax rate and ܧ݉݌݈ is the unemployment rate. 
The empirical panel data analysis employed in this study is conducted on the premise 
of equation (1).  
 
4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
The data analysis performed in this chapter is premised on a sample composed of a 
panel dataset constituted of the five BRICS (cross-sectional units) countries using 
seven research variables (time series data) over the observation period of eight years 
(2008-2015), as outlined on TABLE 3.1.The methodology employed to analyse the 
panel data is aligned to that of Precup (2015) and Groh and Wallmeroth (2016).  
 
4.1. Panel data analysis 
Subsequent to performing the redundant effects testing analysis, the fixed effects (FE) 
model was found to be the better model in comparison to the least squares dummy 
variable and the pooled regression model. It is important to note that the random 
effects model is not analysed in this study as the number of explanatory variables (six 
variables) studied exceed the number of cross-sectional units under study (five 
countries) (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005).  
 
4.1.1. Fixed effects model 
Table 4.1 below shows the results obtained from the FE model. 
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TABLE 4.1: Fixed effects model results  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
t-
Statistic Prob.   
Constant 9.699 3.455 2.807 *0.009 
GDP growth 5.924 1.062 5.577 *0.000 
Unemployment rate -0.287 0.193 -1.491 0.147 
Market cap -0.022 0.007 -3.277 *0.003 
Corporate tax rate -0.206 0.089 -2.299 **0.029 
Corruption index 2.414 1.967 1.227 0.230 
Interest rate 0.063 0.035 1.819 ***0.079 
Fixed Effects (Cross)         
BR_--C -1.442       
RU_--C -3.678       
IN_--C -0.831       
CH_--C -3.004       
SA_--C 8.954       
          
R-squared 0.640 
Mean dependent 
var   -0.085 
Adjusted R-squared 0.516 S.D. dependent var   1.055 
F-statistic 5.166 Durbin-Watson stat   2.207 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000       
* represents the 1% significance level, ** represents the 5% significance level and *** represents the 10% 
significance level. 
Source: Output obtained from the Eviews application  
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The FE model shows that four explanatory variables (as well as the constant) are 
statistically significant. The statistically significant variables are the GDP growth, 
market cap growth, real interest rate and the corporate tax rate. The GDP growth 
variable is shown to have a positive relationship with the dependent variable 
characterized by a coefficient of 5.924. In addition, this positive relationship between 
GDP growth and the dependent variable is in congruence with the results obtained by 
Gompers and Lerner (1998) as well as Romain and de La Potterie (2004).  
 
Interest rates are shown to have a moderately positive relationship with PE investment 
funds raised. This is in line with expectations. The associated coefficient is 0.063, 
which implies that for every unit real interest rates rise by, PE investment funds raised 
increase by 0.063.  
 
The corporate tax rate variable is statistically significant at the 5% level of significance 
and has a negative relationship with the dependent variable characterized by a 
coefficient value of -0.206.  
This follows from the premise that higher tax rates inherently reduce business 
profitability (Beigi, Rafat, & Panah, 2013) and as a result a higher tax rate does not 
incentivize investors to channel capital into high tax economies.  
 
Market cap growth is statistically significant at the 5% level of significance and it has 
a moderately negative relationship with PE investment funds raised. This relationship 
is characterized by the coefficient value of -0.022, which implies that for every single 
unit that the market capitalization among the BRICS countries grows by, the PE 
investment funds raised decrease by 0.022. This finding is aligned to Jeng and Wells 
(2000), who state that there is a negative relationship between market cap growth and 
VC investments. 
 
It is important to note that this result is not in line with the expectation of a positive 
relationship between the dependent variable and the market cap growth. The 
expectation is predicated on the argument that an increase in the market cap is 
indicative of liquidity and viable exit opportunities for PE investors that rely on initial 
public offerings for divestment purposes.  
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The mismatch in the results could be attributed to the assertion made by Felix et al. 
(2007) that market cap also measures capital gains in the stock market, thus an 
increase in the market cap would translate into investing in VC (in this case PE 
investment) being viewed as less attractive than the stock market as an alternative 
asset class for PE investors. This argument translates to investors comparing listed 
companies (stock market) in terms of capital gains as measured by market cap growth 
against unlisted companies (PE investments) within the BRICS countries in pursuit of 
high return yielding assets. The outlined argument can also be linked to the assertion 
that stock markets and PE investments are comparatively uncorrelated in terms of 
volatility and performance (Demaria, 2013). Hence the negative relationship. 
 
The unemployment rate was found to be statistically insignificant as per the FE model 
output, not according to the expectation. This result is in line with Felix et al. (2007), 
as well as Groh and Wallmeroth (2016), who assert that this result is prevalent among 
developing economies. The authors assert that this negative relationship could be 
attributed to a high unemployment rate being a signal for a lacklustre economy which 
inherently indicates tepid entrepreneurial activity, thus low demand for capital funding.  
 
Lastly, the corruption index variable is found to be statistically insignificant among the 
BRICS countries over the observation period (2008-2015). This could be attributed to 
the fact that the corruption perception index employed in this study does not 
exclusively encompass market-related corruption (Groh & Wallmeroth, 2016). It is 
important to note that the positive relationship between the corruption index and the 
PE funds raised observed among the BRICS countries is in agreement with Precup 
(2015) and Groh and Wallmeroth (2016).  
 
Russia is notably the most corrupt country among the BRICS over the observation 
period and inherently it is observed to have the lowest PE funds raised. This is in line 
with Klonowski (2011a), who asserts that Russia is primarily viewed as a risky 
investment destination for a variety of reasons, particularly the payment of bribes and 
widespread corruption practices. It is important to note that, although the relationship 
between the corruption variable and the dependent variable used in this paper is in 
line with various extant studies, the corruption perception index was found to be 
statistically insignificant among the BRICS countries. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
The objective of this paper was to identify and analyse the determinants of private 
equity investments across the BRICS countries. The results show that four of the six 
explanatory variables drive private equity investments across the BRICS countries. 
The main determinants as per the fixed effects estimation model include the GDP 
growth, market capitalization growth, corporate tax rate and the real interest rate.  
Literature has shown that minimal government intervention, the promotion of a 
business-friendly regulatory infrastructure and, in line with the results of this paper, 
lower taxes are important for the promulgation of PE investments.  
 
The value that can be derived from this paper is premised on the different approaches 
that policymakers or governments of the respective emerging countries can exploit to 
drive PE investments in their respective economies. There are possible interventions, 
which policymakers within the BRICS countries could implement to positively drive PE 
investments.  Firstly, innovative ways could be explored to reduce taxes in the interest 
of positively driving PE investments.  Secondly, policymakers could promulgate robust 
regulations and enforcement that seek to protect the rights of investors (domestic and 
foreign) within a country.  Thirdly, governments could incentivize pension funds (of 
public and private companies) to channel some of their investment funds towards PE 
firms. Lastly, governments should promote a culture of entrepreneurship and also note 
that inadequate regulations or lack thereof limits PE investments. 
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